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SEARCHING FOR ADEQUATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY: SUPERVISORY PRIESTS 
AND THE CHURCH’S CHILD SEX ABUSE 
CRISIS 
BENJAMIN D. WASSERMAN† 
ABSTRACT 
  In 2002, the Boston Globe published a report exposing child sex 
abuse by priests and a cover-up by supervisory priests. Supervisory 
priests—church officials who supervise lower-ranking priests—
concealed reports of sexual abuse by lower-ranking priests and created 
substantial risks of sexual abuse to children. Prosecutors tried to hold 
supervisory priests accountable by turning to statutes that either did not 
capture the moral culpability of priests, like statutes prohibiting 
obstruction of justice or contributing to the delinquency of a minor; or 
that did not legally encompass their misconduct, like child-
endangerment statutes. Child endangerment captures the moral 
culpability of supervisory priests’ misconduct, but child-endangerment 
statutes based on the Model Penal Code (MPC) do not legally cover 
supervisory priests or their acts. Though supervisory priests chose to 
suppress reports of child sex abuse, prosecutors cannot constitutionally 
shoehorn misconduct into statutes—like child endangerment—that 
were never before interpreted to apply to individuals like supervisory 
priests. Instead of breaching the supervisory priests’ constitutionally 
guaranteed notice that their conduct constituted child endangerment, 
prosecutors should encourage state legislatures to: 1) extend statutes of 
limitations for crimes against minors and include clergy as mandatory 
reporters; 2) amend child-endangerment statutes to include supervisory 
priests and those similarly situated; and 3) criminalize the reckless 
creation of a substantial risk of child sex abuse, and the reckless failure 
to alleviate that risk when there is a duty to do so. Absent legislative 
action, prosecutors should use statutes that represent a lesser degree of 
moral culpability, such as contributing to the delinquency of a minor 
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or mandatory-reporter statutes. Enacting statutes that both legally 
encompass and adequately reflect the blameworthiness of supervisory 
priests will hopefully deter similar misconduct and protect children 
from sex abuse in institutional settings.  
INTRODUCTION 
On September 27, 2015, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Pope 
Francis told victims of child sexual abuse by Catholic priests that all 
responsible will be “held accountable.”1 But to whom and to what type 
of accountability was the pope referring? Even though the Catholic 
Church’s (Church) child sex abuse scandal was exposed by the Boston 
Globe in 2002,2 pervasive child sexual abuse by priests continues, with 
over 2000 new credible, substantiated3 allegations since 2010.4 
Achieving accountability measures for the priests’ victims through the 
U.S. criminal-justice system has proved easier said than done. 
Problems holding individuals accountable have been especially 
prevalent with the prosecution of high-ranking supervisory priests, 
 
 1. Pope Francis, Remarks of the Pope Francis for Philadelphia Meeting with Survivors 1, 
http://www.usccb.org/about/leadership/holy-see/francis/papal-visit-2015/media-
resources/upload/papal-visit-2015-meeting-with-survivors.pdf [https://perma.cc/43JF-3S56]. 
 2. Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 6, 
2002), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/06/church-allowed-abuse-priest
-for-years/cSHfGkTIrAT25qKGvBuDNM/story.html [https://perma.cc/T3NM-4HG4]. 
 3. Credible allegations are defined as “those that have been substantiated by a preliminary 
investigation [by the relevant diocese, eparchy, or religious institute] and would be eligible to be 
sent to Rome according to Canons 1717 and 1719.” Id. at 61, 63 (emphasis omitted). Canon 1717 
relates to when a church official should undertake a preliminary investigation for a suspected 
violation of Canon Law and certain duties of the official undertaking the investigation. 1983 
CODE c.1717. Canon 1719 requires that the results of the preliminary investigation be kept secret 
if they are not necessary for the Church’s penal process. 1983 CODE c.1719. To determine the 
credibility of a sexual abuse allegation against a church official, “[e]very diocese and eparchy 
follows a process . . . as set forth in canon law and [Articles 4 and 5 of] the Charter for the 
Protections of Children and Young People.” U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, 2015 
ANNUAL REPORT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE CHARTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE 36 (2016) [hereinafter 
2015 ANNUAL REPORT] (citing U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CHARTER FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE 7–8 (2002)). 
 4. See 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 36–37, 42–43 (listing 180 new credible, 
substantiated allegations of sexual abuse of a minor in 2014 and 213 in 2015); U.S. CONFERENCE 
OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: REPORT 
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHARTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG 
PEOPLE 26, 32, 35, 41 (2014) [hereinafter 2013 ANNUAL REPORT] (listing 424 new credible, 
substantiated allegations of sexual abuse of a minor in 2010, 532 in 2011, 411 in 2012, and 391 in 
2013).  
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such as bishops, archbishops, and parish leaders.5 Supervisory priests 
are typically bishops or other “diocesan leaders [who are] responsible 
for the care of [other] priests whose ability to carry out their 
responsibilities in ministry is impaired by physical or psychological 
illness,” such as sexual behavior with a minor.6 Supervisory priests 
often “received . . . report[s] of sexual abuse of a minor by a priest of 
the diocese [and chose] how to respond to the victim and family and 
how to make choices about a course of action for the priest involved.”7 
After receiving reports of abuse by lower-ranking priests—typically 
pastors, associate pastors, or resident priests8—supervisory priests 
sometimes “transferred known abusers to other parishes . . . where 
their reputations were not known . . . in direct conflict with [clinicians’] 
advice,” “misled [parishioners about] the reason for the abuser’s 
transfer,” “tried to keep their files devoid of incriminating evidence,” 
“rarely provided information to local civil authorities and sometimes 
made concerted efforts to prevent reports . . . from reaching law 
enforcement.”9 By doing so, supervisory priests provided abusive 
priests with “a continuing supply of victims.”10 
 
 5. While this Note focuses on the conduct of supervisory priests, it applies to all people who 
supervise others and use the contact their work with children affords them to abuse children. In 
this Note, I choose to focus specifically on the Church scandal because (1) the Boston Globe 
reports in 2002 caused a wave of reaction throughout the United States, and the ensuing 
prosecutions of supervisory priests offer an illustrative snapshot of how states with similar statutes 
employed them differently to address supervisory priests’ conduct, and (2) the high-profile nature 
of the Church’s sex abuse crisis provides a readily understandable vehicle through which to 
explore the egregious conduct of supervisors of individuals who abuse children and the dearth of 
adequate statutes with which to prosecute them. 
 6. KAREN J. TERRY, MARGARET LELAND SMITH, KATARINA SCHUTH, JAMES R. KELLY, 
BRENDA VOLLMAN, & CHRISTINA MASSEY, JOHN JAY COLL. RESEARCH TEAM, THE CAUSES 
AND CONTEXT OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1950–2010, at 76 (U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops 2011) [hereinafter 2011 JOHN JAY 
REPORT].  
 7. Id.; see also Report of the Grand Jury at 43, In re Cty. Investigating Grand Jury XXIII, 
Misc. No. 0009901-2008 (Ct. Com. Pl. Crim. Div. Pa. 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Philadelphia GJ 
Report] (noting that a supervisory priest had a responsibility “to investigate any allegations of 
sexual abuse by priests, . . . [and] make sure that no priest with a history of sexual abuse of minors 
was recommended for assignments, much less for assignments with continued access to 
children”). 
 8. JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SEXUAL ABUSE 
OF MINORS BY CATHOLIC PRIESTS AND DEACONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1950–2002, at 79 (U.S. 
Conference of Catholic Bishops 2004) [hereinafter 2004 JOHN JAY REPORT] (noting that 
approximately 77.8 percent of offending Church officials were serving as pastors, associate 
pastors, or resident priests when the abuse was alleged to have occurred). 
 9. 2011 JOHN JAY REPORT, supra note 6, at 89.  
 10. 2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at 44; Report of the Grand Jury at 6, In re 
Cty. Investigating Grand Jury of September 26, 2001, Misc. No. 01-00-8944 (Ct. Com. Pl. Crim. 
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In light of the pervasive child sex abuse by priests, this Note 
analyzes the various methods that states have embraced to hold 
supervisory priests accountable. After acknowledging that the delayed 
reporting of sexual abuse by victims led to the expiration of the statute 
of limitations for many claims, this Note examines instances in which 
states have used statutes that criminalize obstruction of justice, 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, failure to report suspected 
child abuse in violation of a duty, and child endangerment to prosecute 
supervisory priests and the Church. Jurisdictions that extracted 
concessions from supervisory priests should be applauded; however, 
not all of the statutes employed to prosecute them adequately capture 
their conduct. Either the statute used fails to capture the moral desert 
of supervisory priests—as with obstruction of justice, contributing to 
the delinquency of a minor, and mandatory reporting—or the statute 
does not legally encompass the misconduct of supervisory priests, as 
with child endangerment. After describing the circumstances in which 
two jurisdictions successfully used child-endangerment statutes based 
on the Model Penal Code (MPC) against supervisory priests and 
churches, this Note argues that those jurisdictions were wrong to do so 
because child-endangerment statutes based on the MPC do not legally 
encompass supervisory priests or their conduct. Lastly, this Note 
suggests other potential methods of prosecuting supervisory priests. 
Prosecutions involving child sex abuse in the Archdiocese of 
Philadelphia provide a striking example of the problem with holding 
supervisory priests accountable under child-endangerment statutes. 
Prosecutors from the Philadelphia District Attorney’s office sought to 
hold a supervisory priest, Monseigneur William Lynn, Secretary for 
Clergy for the Archdiocese of Philadelphia,11 accountable for his role 
in the crisis by seeking charges against him for child endangerment.12 
Pennsylvania’s child-endangerment statute was modeled on the MPC 
statute for endangering the welfare of children, which criminalizes 
“violat[ing] . . . a duty of care [of a parent, guardian, or other person 
supervising the welfare of a child] that endangers the child.”13 The 
 
Div. Pa. 2003) [hereinafter 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT] (“[Supervisory priests] most 
directly put children at risk when they knowingly permitted priests whom they knew, or were 
substantially certain, had sexually abused children to have continuing access to children.”). 
 11. Commonwealth v. Lynn, 83 A.3d 434, 437 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013). 
 12. 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 2–3.  
 13. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980); see also 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304 cmt. Joint State Government 
Commission (1967) (“This section is derived from Section 230.4 of the Model Penal Code.”). 
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Philadelphia grand jury agreed that “[i]n the common sense of the 
term, the actions of the church hierarchy clearly constituted 
endangerment of the welfare of children,” but decided it could not 
charge Msgr. Lynn under the statute.14 The grand jury concluded that 
the child-endangerment statute was “too narrow to support a 
successful prosecution of the decisionmakers who were running the 
Archdiocese” because “[h]igh-level Archdiocese officials . . . were far 
removed from any direct contact with children.”15  
After finding that the child-endangerment statute can apply only 
when a person with a duty of care directly supervised the abused child, 
consistent with Pennsylvania precedent,16 the grand jury recommended 
statutory amendments to cover this conduct in future prosecutions.17 In 
2006, with the district attorney’s blessing, the Pennsylvania legislature 
took the grand jury’s recommendations, extending the statute of 
limitations18 and expanding the class of individuals covered by the 
statute to include “a person that employs or supervises . . . a person” 
who supervises a child’s welfare.19  
The Philadelphia district attorney sought to indict Msgr. Lynn 
again in 2011 after previously unknown instances of child sexual abuse 
 
Compare 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304 (West 2006) (“A parent, guardian or other 
person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age commits an offense if he knowingly 
endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or support.”), with 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 (“A parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a 
child under 18 commits a misdemeanor if he knowingly endangers the child’s welfare by violating 
a duty of care, protection or support.”).  
 14. Report of the Grand Jury at 65, In re Cty. Investigating Grand Jury of September 17, 
2003, Misc. No. 03-00-239 (Ct. Com. Pl. Crim. Div. Pa. 2005) [hereinafter 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ 
REPORT]. The 2005 Philadelphia GJ Report was actually a continuation of a report started by a 
2003 Philadelphia grand jury, which was “unable to complete [its] investigation before the 
expiration of the term” for several reasons, including “the magnitude of the abuse, the complexity 
of the issues presented, the large number of clerics accused of molesting children, [and] the 
enormous number of victims.” 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 14–15.   
 15. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 65 (emphasis added).  
 16. See Lynn, 83 A.3d at 450 (noting that “neither [the Superior Court] nor [the] Supreme 
Court ha[d] ever affirmed a conviction for [child endangerment] where the accused was not 
actually engaged in the supervision of, or was responsible for supervising, the endangered child”).  
 17. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 69–76. The grand jury argued that 
amending the child-endangerment statute to include those who supervise individuals who directly 
supervise and abuse children would criminalize “endangerment as a course of conduct” and would 
“clarify that even a person who does not directly come into contact with a child may nevertheless 
be supervising the welfare of the child in a very real sense.” Id. at 72.  
 18. Act of Nov. 29, 2006, No. 179, 2006 Pa. Laws 1586 (codified as amended at 42 PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5552(c)(3) (West 2007)). 
 19. Id. at 1581 (codified as amended at 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304(a)(1) 
(West 2007)).  
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came to light.20 The alleged abuse was more recent than the prior 
alleged conduct, but the pre-amendment version of the statute applied 
because even the more recent allegations occurred before the statute 
was amended.21 Contrary to the 2005 grand jury’s interpretation of the 
child-endangerment statute, the 2011 grand jury indicted Msgr. Lynn 
after applying the same law to substantially similar facts.22 In fact, the 
2011 grand jury “d[id] not hesitate to conclude that the Archdiocese 
understood itself to be responsible for ‘supervising the welfare’ of the 
students . . . entrusted to its care.”23 It concluded that “Msgr. Lynn had 
a duty . . . [and] was responsible for supervising [children’s] welfare 
with respect to abusive priests.”24 After a trial in 2012, a jury convicted 
Msgr. Lynn of endangering the welfare of children when he breached 
that duty by knowingly supervising priests who sexually abused 
children and failing to protect the children.25 
But on appeal the following year, a Pennsylvania Superior Court 
judge overturned Msgr. Lynn’s conviction.26 Just as the 2005 grand jury 
had declined to indict because the statute was written too narrowly to 
include supervisory priests,27 the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
concluded that the statute required “actual supervision of children to 
be an element of the offense.”28 Because Msgr. Lynn had “had no direct 
involvement with the child, [and] never met [nor] knew the child,”29 the 
court deemed him to be outside the scope of the statute.30 The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed, reinstating Msgr. Lynn’s 
conviction in April 2015.31 The Court declared that only the “welfare” 
of the child needs to be supervised32 and that there is no limit on how 
 
 20. 2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at 112–17.  
 21. Id. at 114. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Commonwealth v. Lynn, 83 A.3d 434, 445 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013), rev’d, 114 A.3d 796 (Pa. 
2015). 
 26. Id. at 453–54.  
 27. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 65.  
 28. Lynn, 83 A.3d at 452.  
 29. Id. at 446.  
 30. Id. at 453–54.  
 31. Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 827 (Pa. 2015).  
 32. Id. at 823.  
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far removed a supervising individual can be from the child to be 
covered by the statute.33 
These striking disagreements in the Pennsylvania courts and the 
reversal by the 2011 grand jury exemplify the uncertainty about the 
applicability of child-endangerment statutes to supervisory priests. 
Driven by public pressure and an overwhelming desire to hold 
supervisory priests accountable, prosecutors and courts may be 
shoehorning conduct into legally inadequate statutes. Even though 
supervisory priests recklessly enabled other clergy to sexually abuse 
children for decades,34 it is unconstitutional to convict them under an 
interpretation of a child-endangerment statute based on the MPC that 
represents “an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of 
narrow and precise statutory language,” depriving supervisory priests 
“the right of fair warning.”35  
Apart from prosecutions of supervisory priests, prosecutors used 
supervisory priests’ conduct as the basis for plea agreements with 
individual churches. Several state prosecutions, including those in New 
 
 33. Id. at 824 (“[T]he requirement of supervision is not limited to only certain forms of 
supervision, such as direct or actual . . . . By its plain terms it encompasses all forms of supervision 
of a child’s welfare.”).  
 34. Despite their enablement of abusive priests, supervisory priests cannot be criminally 
charged as accomplices to the sexual abuse itself. Accomplice liability requires that the individual 
has “the purpose of promoting or facilitating” the offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) 
(AM. LAW INST. 2001) (emphasis added); see id. (describing the elements required to qualify as 
an accomplice). Here, the offense to which the supervisory priest would be an accomplice is child 
sex abuse; however, supervisory priests did not have the specific intent to sexually abuse children. 
As one grand jury report that analyzed supervisory priests as accomplices noted, “While the 
actions of the Archdiocese leaders clearly facilitated rapes and other sexual offenses, and ensured 
that more would occur, the evidence . . . did not demonstrate that the leaders acted with the 
specific goal of causing additional sexual violations.” 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 
14, at 64–65 (emphasis added).  
 35. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964); see also United States v. Harriss, 
347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (“The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal 
statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct 
is forbidden by the statute. . . . [N]o man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which 
he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.”). 
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Hampshire,36 Minnesota,37 Missouri,38 and Ohio,39 used respondeat 
superior liability to obtain pleas from churches themselves instead of 
from supervisory priests. Institutions can typically be held vicariously 
liable for the actions of their employees through the theory of 
respondeat superior.40 For the Church entity to be liable for the crimes 
of its employees, the employees must act within the scope of their 
employment with intent to benefit the entity.41 A supervisory priest 
who failed to act on reports of child sex abuse would have acted within 
the scope of his employment because it was his responsibility to hear 
reports of inappropriate behavior and supervise lower-ranking 
priests.42 And such a supervisory priest would have intended to benefit 
the Church by concealing the reports because he wanted to protect the 
reputation of the Church and the abusive priest from the allegations.43 
 
 36. Agreement at 14–15, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 02-S-1154 (N.H. Super. Ct. 2002) 
[hereinafter 2002 New Hampshire Agreement].  
 37. Gross Misdemeanor Criminal Complaint, State v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul and 
Minneapolis, No. 2139124 (Dist. Ct. 2d Jud. Dist. Minn. 2015) [hereinafter 2015 Minnesota 
Complaint]. 
 38. Closed Indictment, State v. Finn, Police No. 11-033224 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Crim. Div. 2011) 
[hereinafter 2011 Missouri Indictment]. 
 39. Laurie Goodstein, Archdiocese of Cincinnati Fined in Sex Abuse Scandal, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 21, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/21/us/archdiocese-of-cincinnati-fined-in-sex-
abuse-scandal.html [http://perma.cc/G8K4-8RPG]. 
 40. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909).  
 41. Id. 
 42. For further discussion of supervisory priest responsibilities over lower-ranking priests, 
see supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
 43. See, e.g., PETER W. HEED, N. WILLIAM DELKER & JAMES D. ROSENBERG, NEW 
HAMPSHIRE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE DIOCESE 
OF MANCHESTER 97 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT] (recounting a 
diocesan response to an allegation of child sex abuse, which stated that “[m]aking those problems 
public would destroy [the offending priest’s] ability to contribute further [to the Church]” and 
“going public now with the [abuse allegations] would . . . jeopardize [the offending priest’s] 
limited ministry, to no constructive end”); id. at 133 (describing statements by a diocesan official 
related to sexual abuse allegations against a priest and noting that the diocese “w[as] not really 
looking . . . for any publicity” and “wanted this to be something . . . that [it] could handle . . . and 
it would be quiet”); 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 3 (finding that despite 
their awareness of priests who posed a danger to children, “these Archdiocesan managers 
continued and/or established policies that made the protection of the Church from ‘scandal’ more 
important than the protection of children from sexual predators”); see also APRIL ‘E’ 2002 
WESTCHESTER CTY. GRAND JURY, REPORT OF THE APRIL ‘E’ 2002 WESTCHESTER COUNTY 
GRAND JURY CONCERNING COMPLAINTS OF SEXUAL ABUSE AND MISCONDUCT AGAINST 
MINORS BY MEMBERS OF THE CLERGY 7 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 WESTCHESTER NY GJ 
REPORT] (inferring that the supervisory priests’ failure to act on allegations of child sex abuse 
“was an orchestrated effort to protect abusing clergy members from investigation, arrest and 
prosecution . . . [and to] protect[] the religious institution from adverse publicity that might have 
affected its economic welfare”); 2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at 43 (finding that a 
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Because any church plea is merely an extension of the supervisory 
priest’s criminal conduct, a plea or conviction of a church based on 
supervisory priests’ conduct is treated here in the same light as if it were 
a conviction of a supervisory priest.  
This Note argues that although child-endangerment statutes are 
the only statutes used to prosecute supervisory priests that adequately 
reflect their moral culpability, child-endangerment statutes based on 
the MPC do not legally encompass supervisory priests’ conduct. 
Holding supervisory priests liable under those statutes is an 
unconstitutional attempt to shoehorn morally reprehensible conduct 
into a statute that was not meant to—and legally does not—apply to 
that class of individuals. Such shoehorning by states like Pennsylvania 
breaches the Constitution’s notice requirement for criminal conduct to 
achieve accountability for misconduct by supervisory priests.  
But there are better approaches to holding these priests 
accountable. In light of the legal insufficiency of child-endangerment 
statutes, states should employ the following strategies to prosecute 
supervisory priests now and for future conduct: (1) extend or eliminate 
statutes of limitations for crimes involving the abuse of minors and 
include clergy as mandatory reporters of child abuse; (2) amend child-
endangerment statutes to cover the conduct of supervisory priests and 
other similarly situated individuals; (3) pass statutes, like those in 
Massachusetts, that criminalize the reckless creation of a substantial 
risk of child sex abuse and the failure to alleviate that risk;44 and (4) as 
a last resort, use existing statutes that cover the conduct of supervisory 
priests but do not reflect their moral blameworthiness, such as 
mandatory-reporting and delinquency statutes.  
Part I of this Note provides a brief background of the Church’s sex 
abuse crisis and profiles state criminal investigations into child sex 
abuse by priests. This Part evaluates the purposes of and moral 
culpability associated with different statutes used to hold supervisory 
priests and churches liable for their roles in the crisis. Part II focuses 
on the use of child-endangerment statutes based on the MPC to 
prosecute supervisory priests and churches and argues that those 
 
supervisory priest purposefully abdicated his responsibility to protect children from sexual abuse 
by priests so that “the Archdiocese was spared public exposure or costly lawsuits”); OFFICE OF 
THE ATT’Y GEN., COMMONWEALTH OF PA., A REPORT OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH STATEWIDE 
INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY 6, 12 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 PENNSYLVANIA GJ REPORT] 
(“[Supervisory priests] took actions that further endangered children as they placed their desire 
to avoid public scandal [and protect the institution] over the wellbeing of innocent children.”).   
 44. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13L (West 2015).  
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statutes reflect the moral culpability of supervisory priests but do not 
legally cover their conduct. Part III offers prescriptions for holding 
supervisory priests accountable in the future by suggesting 
amendments and new statutes that more effectively target the conduct 
of supervisory priests. Part IV concludes by encouraging state 
legislatures to enact statutes that legally encompass the conduct of 
supervisory priests and result in punishments that reflect the 
seriousness of their actions.  
I.  STATE PROSECUTIONS OF SUPERVISORY PRIESTS 
A. Background 
Between 1950 and 2002, there were 10,667 individual reports of 
sexual abuse in the United States against 4392 different priests.45 
Despite the overwhelming number of reports by the end of 2002, just 
14 percent of those abusers were referred to the police, resulting in 
criminal convictions in only 3 percent of cases.46 Approximately one 
third of the 10,667 abuse reports were made in 2002 alone, up from 
fewer than three hundred each year for the previous five years.47 This 
striking surge in sex abuse reports in 2002 was likely the product of an 
investigative series published by the Boston Globe48 into reports of 
child sex abuse by Father John Geoghan of the Archdiocese of 
Boston.49 With reports of child sex abuse in the Church thrust into the 
national consciousness, prosecutors around the country were 
determined to hold Church officials accountable. 
Prosecutors sought to charge not only the priests who engaged in 
abuse but also supervisory priests who knew of abuse and who denied, 
concealed, and enabled it. These supervisory priests were responsible 
for “investigat[ing] any allegations of sexual abuse by priests . . . [and] 
mak[ing] sure that no priest with a history of sexual abuse of minors 
was recommended for assignments.”50 Instead of fulfilling these duties, 
 
 45. 2011 JOHN JAY REPORT, supra note 6, at 27. 
 46. Id. at 10.  
 47. Id. at 9.  
 48. See id. at 6.  
 49. Rezendes, supra note 2. The uncovering of the abuse and the Boston Globe’s 
investigative reports were most recently profiled in the critically acclaimed film, SPOTLIGHT 
(Anonymous Content 2015). The continued focus on the Church sex abuse scandal, especially in 
pop culture, reflects how prominent the crisis still is in America’s national consciousness.  
 50. E.g., 2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at 43. For further discussion of 
supervisory priest responsibilities, see supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.  
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they routinely suppressed reports of abuse and “passively allow[ed] the 
molesters to remain in positions where they could continue to prey on 
children.”51 Worse, “[w]hen victims complained or scandal 
threatened,” supervisory priests recommended transferring the 
abusive priests to new parishes52 “where unsuspecting parents and 
teachers would entrust children to their care.”53 
State and local prosecutors called for grand jury investigations and 
issued attorneys general reports detailing supervisory priest conduct 
and analyzing possible prosecution strategies. District attorneys and 
state attorneys general in at least nine states have sought to hold 
supervisory priests or churches criminally liable for their roles in 
enabling child sexual abuse.54 The first grand jury investigation of a 
supervisory priest was opened in Westchester County, New York, on 
April 29, 2002,55 just four months after the Boston Globe published the 
initial investigative reports.56 The public pressure arising from the flood 
of child sex abuse reports led state and local prosecutors to turn to a 
variety of different statutes to hold the supervisory priests and 
 
 51. E.g., 2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at 43. 
 52. E.g., id.; see also David Gibson, The Bishop and the Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES  
(June 7, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/07/opinion/the-bishop-and-the-prosecutor.html 
[https://perma.cc/CER4-SUXA] (“In exchange for immunity from prosecution, Bishop O’Brien 
admitted that several times during his 22-year tenure he placed children in harm’s way by 
transferring priests who had been accused of sexual abuse to parishes, and that he never informed 
either the priests’ new superiors or parishioners.” (emphasis omitted)). For further discussion of 
how supervisory priests responded to allegations of sexual abuse by lower-ranking priests, see 
supra note 43 and accompanying text. Cf. 2011 JOHN JAY REPORT, supra note 6, at 81 (noting that 
from 1950–2003, just 8.5 percent of priests who allegedly sexually abused children were required 
to resign or retire).  
 53. 2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at 45; see, e.g., G. STEVEN ROWE, STATE OF 
MAINE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., A REPORT BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: ON THE 
ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN BY PRIESTS AND OTHER CLERGY MEMBERS 
ASSOCIATED WITH THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN MAINE 11 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 
MAINE AG REPORT] (describing an instance where an abusive priest was transferred to a new 
parish, but the diocese “did not notify the [new] parish of the past allegations”); 2002 
WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 7–8 (finding that after receiving reports of child 
sex abuse by priests, the religious institution would ignore communications from the victims, 
conduct an “internal investigation . . . [that] was primarily geared to delay, with the hope that the 
victim . . . would not persist in pursuing their claim” and “consistently shuttle[] the abuser from 
place to place each time an allegation came to light . . . without notifying anyone locally, including 
the other clergy at the new assignment, of the transferee’s prior troubling history . . . put[ting] 
more children at risk”). 
 54. For a detailed description of these efforts, see infra Parts I.B–E, 2.C–D.  
 55. 2002 WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 2. 
 56. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
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churches accountable. These statutes included obstruction of justice,57 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor,58 mandatory reporting of 
suspicions of child sex abuse,59 and child endangerment.60 Other 
jurisdictions concluded that no statute could hold supervisory priests 
accountable either because the relevant statutes of limitations had 
expired or because the conduct did not meet statutory requirements.61 
B. Failure to Charge Due to Statutes of Limitations or Other Legal 
Inadequacies 
In many cases, supervisory priests avoided criminal prosecution 
because of the extended delays in victims reporting abuse62 and the 
relatively short statutes of limitations for the offenses with which the 
supervisory priests were most likely to be charged.63 Delayed reporting 
 
 57. E.g., Alan Cooperman, Bishop Avoids Charges: Phoenix Prelate Gives Up Power in  
Sex Abuse Cases, WASH. POST (June 3, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/pb/archive/
politics/2003/06/03/bishop-avoids-charges/f77a4dab-ee8c-4c0d-9a53-ebd882f6efb4 [http://perma.
cc/4MHA-JWN2] (discussing the investigating attorney’s threats of prosecuting under felony 
obstruction-of-justice charges under ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2409 (2016)). 
 58. E.g., 2015 Minnesota Complaint, supra note 37, at 1–2 (charging under MINN. STAT. 
§ 260B.425.1(a) (1999)).  
 59. E.g., 2011 Missouri Indictment, supra note 38, at 1 (charging under MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 210.115 (West 2014)); Jim Doyle, Santa Rosa/Bishop Avoids Charge in Failure to Swiftly Report 
Abuse Claims/Counseling Instead of Misdemeanor for Delay in Notification, SFGATE (Nov. 21, 
2006, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/SANTA-ROSA-Bishop-avoids-charge-
in-failure-to-2466423.php [https://perma.cc/5K8P-AAB4]; Goodstein, supra note 39.  
 60. E.g., Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 798 (Pa. 2015) (charging under 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 4304(a) (1995)); 2002 New Hampshire Agreement, supra note 36, at 2 (charging under 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3 (LexisNexis 2016)); 2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at 
114 (charging under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4304(a) (1995)). 
 61. E.g., 2004 MAINE AG REPORT, supra note 53, at 2; OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC 
ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON: A REPORT BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 2 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 
MASSACHUSETTS AG REPORT]; 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT supra note 43, at 154; 2016 
PENNSYLVANIA GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 146; 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 
14, at 69–70; 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 15–16; SUFFOLK CTY. SUPREME 
COURT SPECIAL GRAND JURY, GRAND JURY REPORT, at 175 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 SUFFOLK 
NY GJ REPORT]; 2002 WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 13. 
 62. In 2002, a study found that although 80.5 percent of the reported incidents of abuse “had 
taken place by 1985 . . . only 810 incidents had been reported to dioceses by that time.” 2011 JOHN 
JAY REPORT, supra note 6, at 9. See 2004 MAINE AG REPORT, supra note 53, at 6 (“Most of the 
complaint were not brought to the Diocese’s attention (or the attention of authorities) until many 
years after the alleged conduct.”).  
 63. Virtually all grand jury reports related to charges for supervisory priests cited an expired 
statute of limitations as a reason for failing to bring at least some charges and recommended 
increasing or removing the statute of limitations. For examples of these reports, see supra note 61 
and accompanying text.  
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of abuse is common, as “many victims need decades to come forward 
. . . often [because] it is not until years after the sexual abuse that 
victims experience negative outcomes.”64 Many negative effects of 
child sexual abuse do not surface until adulthood, “includ[ing] ‘sexual 
problems, dysfunctions or compulsions, confusion and struggles over 
gender and sexual identity, homophobia . . . problems with intimacy, 
shame, guilt and self-blame, low self-esteem and negative self-images, 
and anger.’”65 Most statutes of limitations for child sex abuse crimes 
still fail to account for the typical reporting delay, allowing many child 
sex abusers to escape prosecution.66 Even if a prosecutor attempted to 
charge a supervisory priest in 2002 just after receiving a delayed report 
of child sex abuse, the statute of limitations for misdemeanors or 
nonmajor felonies would likely have long expired.67 To address this 
discrepancy, nearly all of the grand jury or attorneys general reports 
that investigated supervisory priest conduct recommended that state 
legislatures extend the statutes of limitations for certain claims—
including for crimes “where the victim of a sex offense is a minor”68—
 
 64. Marci A. Hamilton, Child Sex Abuse in Institutional Settings: What Is Next, 89 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 421, 429 (2012); see also 2002 WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 
3 (explaining that “children who are sexually abused often experience memory suppression,” 
sometimes causing reporting delays of “[t]wenty to thirty years”); cf. Laura Russell, Note, 
Pursuing Criminal Liability for the Church and Its Decision Makers for their Role in Priest Sexual 
Abuse, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 885, 914 (2003) (recognizing how the delayed reporting of child sex 
abuse and insufficiently long statutes of limitations preclude criminal liability for supervisory and 
abusive priests). For statistics on victims’ delayed reporting of child sex abuse by priests, see supra 
notes 46–48, 61–63 and accompanying text.  
 65. Hamilton, supra note 64, at 429 (quoting David Lisak, The Psychological Impact of 
Sexual Abuse: Content Analysis of Interviews with Male Survivors, 7 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 525, 
526 (1994)).   
 66. See id. at 431–33 (describing how victims of sexual abuse are thwarted by the short 
statutes of limitations for criminal and civil laws that could be used to hold their attackers 
accountable). For examples of statutes of limitations for some state child-endangerment statutes, 
see infra note 67.  
 67. New Hampshire’s statute of limitations for endangering the welfare of a child, N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 639:3 (LexisNexis 2015), a misdemeanor, is one year after the conduct. Id. § 625:8. 
New York’s child-endangerment statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 2015), also a 
misdemeanor, has a statute of limitations of two years, id. § 30.10(2)(c). Pennsylvania’s child-
endangerment statute, 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304 (West 2015), a misdemeanor 
or felony based on the course of conduct, has the longest statute of limitations and, until 2007, 
tolled the statute of limitations until the minor’s eighteenth birthday and then added two years. 
41 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5552(c)(3) (West 2006). Even the longest statute of 
limitations for child endangerment would have expired by 2000 for a five-year-old child abused 
in 1985, considering the minor would have turned eighteen in 1998 and adding two years, per the 
Pennsylvania statute of limitations.  
 68. 2002 WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 1; see also 2003 PHILADELPHIA 
GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 15–17 (recommending that the statute of limitations be extended); 
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or amend child-endangerment69 or mandatory-reporting statutes70 to 
ensure that supervisory priests’ conduct is within the scope of liability.  
In the first attempt to criminally charge supervisory priests, a 
grand jury from Westchester County concluded:  
[I]n the face of overwhelming evidence of sexual abuse and 
misconduct . . . the religious institution never reported such 
allegations to law enforcement authorities. . . . The Grand Jury infers 
that this was an orchestrated effort to protect abusing clergy members 
from investigation, arrest and prosecution . . . [and] the religious 
institution from adverse publicity.71 
Despite these excoriating findings, the grand jury was unable to charge 
any supervisory priest. The grand jury recommended that the 
legislature include clergy among mandatory reporters of child sex 
abuse and criminalize “the reckless supervision by employers of 
employees known to have harmed children.”72 In recognizing that a 
major impediment to prosecution was the victims’ prolonged delay in 
reporting abuse, the grand jury “urge[d] the Legislature to amend the 
. . . [l]aw to eliminate the Statute of Limitations where the victim of a 
sex offense is a minor.”73  
One year later, a Suffolk County, New York, grand jury released 
a 181-page report regarding alleged child sexual abuse by the Diocese 
of Rockville Centre that came to similar conclusions.74 The grand jury 
likewise found that the diocese “ignored credible complaints [and] 
failed to act on obvious warning signs of sexual abuse . . . [e]ven where 
 
2003 SUFFOLK NY GJ REPORT, supra note 61, at 175–76 (same); 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ 
REPORT, supra note 14, at 69–70 (same); 2016 PENNSYLVANIA GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 146 
(same).  
 69. 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 17; 2003 SUFFOLK NY GJ REPORT, 
supra note 61, at 177; 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 72–73. 
 70. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 73–74; 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ 
REPORT, supra note 10, at 17; 2003 SUFFOLK NY GJ REPORT, supra note 61, at 178; 2002 
WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 1; see also OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN THE ROMAN 
CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION 
3 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 MASSACHUSETTS AG EXEC. REPORT] (noting that Massachusetts’s 
“child abuse reporting law [was] not applicable because it was not expanded to include priests 
until 2002”). 
 71. 2002 WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 7.  
 72. Id. at 13.  
 73. Id. at 6.  
 74. 2003 SUFFOLK NY GJ REPORT, supra note 61.  
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a priest disclosed sexually abusive behavior with children.”75 Although 
supervisory priest conduct “warranted criminal prosecution . . . [it is] 
precluded because there was no legal responsibility on the part of 
priests to report what they knew about child abuse and . . . prosecution 
[is] beyond the statute of limitations.”76 Because supervisory priest 
conduct did not fall within any New York criminal statute, the grand 
jury recommended amending mandatory-reporter statutes to include 
religious officials, expanding child-endangerment statutes to include 
supervisory priests and religious institutions, and either eliminating the 
statute of limitations for crimes against minors or extending it to a 
minimum of fifteen years after the minor turns eighteen.77  
Later that year, similar impediments led the Massachusetts 
attorney general to issue a report resulting in no criminal charges 
against the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston or its supervisory 
priests. The report found that the archdiocese did not adequately 
supervise priests whom it knew sexually abused children, concealed 
reports of abuse from law enforcement, and placed children at risk by 
transferring abusive priests to other parishes without telling the new 
parish about the allegations against the priest.78 Unfortunately, despite 
the overwhelming evidence of abuse and cover-up by diocese officials, 
Massachusetts could not bring charges because, until 2002, 
Massachusetts’s law requiring the mandatory reporting of child abuse 
did not include priests,79 and its child endangerment law did not 
encompass the conduct of supervisory priests.80 “If these laws had been 
in place earlier, . . . [Massachusetts] would have had much more 
effective tools at [its] disposal as [it] sought to hold accountable those 
responsible for placing children at risk for sexual abuse.”81 
In 2004, Maine’s attorney general investigated the Catholic 
Diocese of Portland “to determine whether the Diocese, the Bishop or 
other administrative personnel had any criminal liability arising from 
their supervisory role over the accused priests.”82 Like the other 
charging attempts by the Massachusetts attorney general and New 
 
 75. Id. at 172.  
 76. Id. at 174.  
 77. Id. at 175–78.  
 78. 2003 MASSACHUSETTS AG EXEC. REPORT, supra note 70, at 3–5.  
 79. Id. at 3; 2003 MASSACHUSETTS AG REPORT, supra note 61, at 22–23.  
 80. See 2003 MASSACHUSETTS AG REPORT, supra note 61, at 24 (describing a law passed by 
the Massachusetts legislature in 2002 that created the crime of recklessly endangering children).  
 81. Id. 
 82. 2004 MAINE AG REPORT, supra note 53, at 2. 
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York grand juries, the Maine attorney general concluded that “no 
prosecutable cases [fell] within the statute of limitations”83 and that 
there was “no criminal liability on the part of the Bishop, the Diocese 
or its administrative staff” under the current statutes as written.84  
In 2003, 2005, and 2016, grand juries in Pennsylvania concluded 
that the applicable statutes of limitations prevented the prosecution of 
supervisory priests, or that the relevant statutes did not legally 
encompass the conduct of supervisory priests. A 2003 Philadelphia 
grand jury recognized that “the statute of limitations currently in effect 
may preclude the prosecution of . . . those individuals who covered up 
the crimes and/or allowed them to occur”85 and that current 
Pennsylvania statutes were not legally sufficient to prosecute 
supervisory priests.86 In 2005, a Philadelphia grand jury concluded that 
“while the actions of the Archdiocese leaders clearly facilitated rapes 
and other sexual offenses [by priests] and ensured that more would 
occur,” “legal definitions and statute of limitations problems . . . 
prevent prosecution.”87 Finally, in 2016, a grand jury found that certain 
supervisory priests in the Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown “failed to 
protect children entrusted to their care and guidance” by “plac[ing] 
their desire to avoid public scandal over the wellbeing of innocent 
children” and “return[ing the abusive priests] to ministry with full 
knowledge they were child predators.”88 The grand jury then 
recognized that supervisory priests could not be prosecuted because 
the statutes of limitations for many of the relevant criminal statutes had 
expired.89 To resolve these issues, the grand juries called for extending 
or eliminating statutes of limitations for sexual offenses against 
minors90 and amending or enacting statutes to criminalize the conduct 
of supervisory priests.91  
 
 83. Id. at 2. 
 84. Id. at 3. 
 85. 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 15. 
 86. See id. at 17 (calling for the enactment of a statute that criminalizes recklessly engaging 
in conduct that creates a substantial risk of harm to a child and for the clarification of the 
mandatory-reporter law as applied to clergy).  
 87. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 64–69 (analyzing various ways that 
archdiocesan officials could be prosecuted and finding them all legally insufficient).   
 88. 2016 PENNSYLVANIA GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 6.  
 89. Id. at 146. 
 90. 2016 PENNSYLVANIA GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 146; 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ 
REPORT, supra note 14, at 69–72; 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 16–17.  
 91. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 72–74; 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ 
REPORT, supra note 10, at 17. 
WASSERMAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/30/2017  11:38 AM 
2017]     SUPERVISORY PRIEST ACCOUNTABILITY 1165 
C. Obstruction of Justice 
Statutes that prohibit obstructing justice help protect the integrity 
of legal proceedings and the justice system by targeting “a broad range 
of behavior that impedes or defeats the operation of government.”92 In 
upholding a statute that criminalized obstructing justice, the Supreme 
Court recognized the “legitimate interest [of states] in protecting 
[their] judicial system[s],” and “the utmost importance that the 
administration of justice be absolutely fair and orderly.”93 Specific 
formulations of what qualifies as obstruction vary from state to state, 
but, generally, individuals who knowingly obstruct, delay, or prevent 
government operations, criminal investigations, or the communication 
of information related to a criminal violation to government officials, 
violate the statute.94 The mere act of doing something that might 
eventually obstruct justice, such as destroying an incriminating 
document, typically does not qualify as obstructing justice unless there 
is some nexus between the destruction of the document and knowledge 
of an investigation or official proceeding.95 Because the actions of 
supervisory priests in covering up allegations of child sexual abuse 
precluded the government from investigating and potentially charging 
the abusive priests, some jurisdictions tried to charge supervisory 
priests with obstruction of justice.  
In one case, a bishop of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of 
Phoenix, Arizona, entered into a legal agreement with the Maricopa 
County district attorney, admitting to “conceal[ing] sexual abuse of 
children by priests” in lieu of being prosecuted for obstruction of 
justice.96 The district attorney considered charging Bishop Thomas J. 
O’Brien with obstruction of justice for “instruct[ing] a priest . . . to 
persuade a Catholic family not to report an incident of sexual 
molestation to the police” and for firing the priest when he refused.97 
Instead of charging O’Brien, the district attorney entered into a 
comprehensive agreement with the archdiocese to stop the abuse and 
implement adequate controls to prevent future child sex abuse.98 The 
 
 92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.1 Introductory Note for Sections 242.1–242.8 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2001). 
 93. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965).  
 94. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2402 (2016); id. § 13-2409. 
 95. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 709 (2005); United States v. 
Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995).  
 96. Cooperman, supra note 57. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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district attorney successfully extracted admissions from O’Brien about 
his complicity in enabling priests to sexually abuse children by failing 
to take action to stop them.99 As part of the agreement, O’Brien 
“acknowledge[d] that he allowed . . . priests under his supervision to 
have contact with minors after becoming aware of allegations of 
criminal sexual misconduct . . . [and that he] transferr[ed] offending 
priests to situations where children could be further victimized.”100 The 
district attorney also secured for the church a new sexual-misconduct 
policy, victim-advocate positions, a training program on the 
mandatory-reporting law, and a $300,000 fund to support the 
counseling of those victimized by the church’s priests.101  
The Maricopa County district attorney should be commended for 
securing admissions from a supervisory priest and for requiring the 
archdiocese to pay restitution and implement safeguards against future 
abuse. Using the threat of an obstruction-of-justice charge against 
O’Brien was effective in securing a measure of justice. But the conduct 
meant to be covered by obstruction statutes pales in comparison to the 
conduct in which O’Brien and other supervisory priests engaged.  
Obstruction statutes can be violated by simply destroying an 
incriminating document or trying to persuade a witness not to testify.102 
Statutes that criminalize such conduct seem deficient in addressing the 
conduct of supervisory priests, who endangered the welfare of children 
by knowingly putting them in positions where they were likely to be 
abused by historically abusive priests and actively concealing that 
abuse.103 Supervisory priests’ conduct by itself, no matter how 
reprehensible, would not even constitute obstruction of justice unless 
the conduct was in some way connected to a government investigation 
or proceeding.104 Although O’Brien may have in fact been guilty of 
obstruction of justice, to threaten prosecution under that statute seems, 
as a normative matter, woefully inadequate to address the seriousness 
 
 99. May 3, 2003 Agreement between State of Arizona, ex rel. Richard M. Romley, Maricopa 
County Attorney, Thomas J. O’Brien, Bishop of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Phoenix, and 
the Roman Catholic Diocese of Phoenix (Ariz. 2003), http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/
bishopagreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DSH-D6WX].  
 100. Id. at 3. 
 101. Id.  
 102. For further discussion on what constitutes obstruction of justice and the purpose of that 
type of statute, see supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.  
 103. For further discussion of supervisory priests’ role in perpetuating child sex abuse by 
lower-ranking priests, see supra notes 43, 52–53 and accompanying text.  
 104. For further discussion on what qualifies as obstruction of justice, see supra note 95 and 
accompanying text.  
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of O’Brien’s depraved conduct. Even if a degree of justice was 
achieved through the prosecutor’s threatened obstruction charge, the 
tangential relation of the charge to O’Brien’s true crimes leaves a wide 
gap between the culpability associated with obstruction of justice and 
O’Brien’s misconduct.  
D. Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor 
Prosecutors have also attempted to hold supervisory priests liable 
for concealing child sex abuse through “contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor” statutes. By the 1960s, most states had a 
statute that criminalized conduct that “corrupt[s] the morals”105 or 
“‘contributes’ to the ‘delinquency, dependency, or neglect’ of a 
child.”106 The purpose of these statutes was “to punish an adult for 
subjecting a child to influences requiring judicial intervention on the 
child’s behalf.”107 Delinquency statutes are expansive, criminalizing 
“[a] range of behavior . . . as broad as the whole penal code and 
more.”108 Some examples of conduct punishable under a delinquency 
statute include encouraging a child to refuse to salute the American 
flag,109 allowing a minor “to be present in a place where [intoxicating] 
beverages were sold,”110 and taking a teenage girl for a ride in a car 
“against her father’s orders . . . even though the girl asked for the 
ride.”111 Despite the breadth of conduct covered by delinquency 
statutes, most states uniformly “treated . . . [all conduct that results in] 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor . . . as a misdemeanor 
punishable by imprisonment of one year or less.”112 Delinquency 
statutes therefore assign the same misdemeanor-grade punishment to 
“such disparate behavior as raping a child, buying stolen goods from a 
juvenile, serving alcohol to a teenager, and encouraging an adolescent 
to evade the control of his parents.”113 Although most of the cases 
under the delinquency statute “had some sexual connotation,”114 
 
 105. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 cmt. 1 at 444 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980).  
 106. Id. at 445. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 446.  
 109. Id. (citing State v. Davis, 120 P.2d 808 (Ariz. 1942)). 
 110. Id. (citing State v. Sobelman, 271 N.W. 484 (Minn. 1937)).  
 111. Id. at 448 (citing State v. Harris, 141 S.E. 637 (W. Va. 1928)).  
 112. Id. at 449.  
 113. Id. at 450.  
 114. Id. at 447. 
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delinquency statutes “contravene the general precept that criminal 
laws should state their proscriptions with fair specificity and 
precision.”115 The broad range of conduct covered by delinquency 
statutes made them a candidate for use in prosecutions of supervisory 
priests and churches. 
In June 2015, the district attorney of Ramsey County, Minnesota, 
issued a forty-four page indictment of the Archdiocese of Saint Paul 
and Minneapolis, charging it with “Contribut[ing] to Need for 
Protection or Services” and “Contributing to Status as Juvenile Petty 
Offender or Delinquency.”116 The indictment recounted the 
archdiocese’s awareness of priest Curtis Wehmeyer’s long history of 
child sexual abuse and lascivious conduct.117 Wehmeyer had an 
extensive record of child sex abuse: he sexually assaulted two boys in 
2010 and pleaded guilty in November 2012 to sexual assault and 
possession of child pornography.118 The indictment alleged that the 
archdiocese had policies “to prevent harm to children . . . [which] were 
not followed”119 and that the archdiocese’s practice of covering up 
priest sex abuse was “not isolated or unique.”120 After over a year of 
settlement negotiations, the district attorney agreed to drop the 
charges against the archdiocese “in exchange for its admission that it 
failed to protect three children from sexual abuse.”121 
Just as the Maricopa County district attorney gained concessions 
through his threatened prosecution of the Phoenix archdiocese under 
the obstruction statute, the Ramsey County district attorney should be 
commended for using Minnesota’s delinquency statute to extract 
admissions from the Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis. But 
the widely disparate conduct captured by the delinquency statute 
diminishes the perceived egregiousness of the supervisory priests’ 
conduct. The indictment details repeated instances in which 
 
 115. Id. at 449.  
 116. 2015 Minnesota Complaint, supra note 37, at 1.  
 117. Id. at 4–29. 
 118. Melanie Sommer, Defrocked Priest Curtis Wehmeyer Pleads Guilty, Is Sentenced in a 3rd 
Sexual Abuse Case, BRING ME THE NEWS (Aug. 18, 2015), http://bringmethenews.com/2015/
08/18/defrocked-priest-curtis-wehmeyer-pleads-guilty-is-sentenced-in-a-third-sexual-abuse-case 
[http://perma.cc/NP4J-N9TM].  
 119. 2015 Minnesota Complaint, supra note 37, at 25. 
 120. Id. at 29.  
 121. Laurie Goodstein & Richard Pérez-Peña, Minnesota Priest’s Memo Says Vatican 
Ambassador Tried to Stifle Sex Abuse Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/us/minnesota-priests-memo-says-vatican-envoy-tried-to-stifle-sex-
abuse-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/2LAE-K2BU].  
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supervisory priests were made aware of Wehmeyer’s child sex abuse, 
chose to conceal the reports, promoted Wehmeyer, and placed him in 
a training program the supervisory priests knew was ineffective, 
leaving more children vulnerable to a known sexual predator.122 
Prosecuting the supervisory priests’ misconduct under the same type of 
statute that also criminalizes encouraging a minor to refuse to salute 
the American flag123—both of which could be punished as 
misdemeanors carrying a maximum sentence of one year of 
imprisonment and a modest fine124—adds insult to the injuries of 
Wehmeyer’s many victims and fails to capture the moral desert of the 
supervisory priests. Thus, although the threat of a delinquency charge 
was effective in obtaining admissions of guilt, the moral 
blameworthiness associated with the delinquency statute does not 
approach the egregiousness of supervisory priests’ conduct and the 
harm they inflicted on innocent children.  
E. Mandatory Reporting of Child Abuse 
Statutes that require clergy to report suspicions of child abuse 
seem like an obvious tool for prosecutors to use against supervisory 
priests. As of November 2013, all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia had statutes identifying persons who are required to report 
suspected child abuse to authorities, and forty-eight states had statutes 
that designate certain professions whose members must report.125 
States began passing mandatory-reporting laws based on model 
language proposed by the Children’s Bureau126 in 1963 as a reaction to 
a prominent study on the pervasiveness of child abuse.127 By the time 
 
 122. 2015 Minnesota Complaint, supra note 37, at 4–29. 
 123. For examples of other conduct criminalized by delinquency statutes, see supra notes 109–
11 and accompanying text.  
 124. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1008 (1939) (stating that the maximum sentence for 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor is one year of imprisonment or a $350 fine, or both); 
2015 Minnesota Complaint, supra note 37, at 1 (stating that the maximum sentence for a violation 
of the delinquency statute is “1 year or $3,000 fine, or both”). The definitions of the relevant 
gradations of crimes are found in MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02 (2015). 
 125. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN 
& FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MANDATORY REPORTERS OF  
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1 (2015), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/EE3E-FK3T] [hereinafter CHILDREN’S BUREAU MANDATORY REPORTERS].  
 126. Robert E. Shepard, Jr., The Abused Child and the Law, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 182, 
190 (1965). 
 127. Leonard G. Brown, III & Kevin Gallagher, Mandatory Reporting of Abuse: A Historical 
Perspective on the Evolution of States’ Current Mandatory Reporting Laws with a Review of the 
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the federal government passed the Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act (CAPTA)128 in 1974, which conditioned federal grants 
on the enactment of mandatory-reporting laws, every state had a 
mandatory-reporting law.129 The purpose of these laws was “to 
facilitate the discovery of instances of suspected child abuse by 
requiring . . . physicians and others to report their suspicions [of abuse] 
. . . [with the] hope[] th[at] steps taken subsequent to the report 
diminish the prospect of further injury to the child.”130 These laws 
initially targeted physicians because of their role in monitoring health 
and the physical nature of child abuse,131 and the laws typically 
“cloth[ed] the physician with a statutory immunity from [civil and 
criminal] liability” arising from a good-faith report of abuse.132  
A mandatory reporter who fails to report child abuse is guilty of a 
misdemeanor in most states, with just four states classifying the 
conduct as a felony under certain circumstances.133 Twenty-seven states 
include clergy as professionals who are required to report known or 
suspected instances of child abuse or neglect.134 As a result of the 
limited number of states that include clergy among mandatory 
reporters, only some states that considered charges against the Church 
or supervisory priests were able to prosecute them under mandatory-
reporting statutes.135  
In one case from November 2003, the Archdiocese of Cincinnati 
pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor for “failing to report sexually abusive 
 
Laws in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 37, 37 (2013). The 
prominent study on the pervasiveness of child abuse is titled “The Battered-Child Syndrome.” Id.  
 128. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5116 (2012)). 
 129. Brown & Gallagher, supra note 130, at 38.  
 130. Monrad G. Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1967); see also Victor I. Vieth, Passover in Minnesota: Mandated Reporting 
and the Unequal Protection of Abused Children, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 131, 155 (1998) 
(noting that “it is logical to require [teachers] to report [child] abuse” because they “are in regular 
contact with children”).  
 131. Paulsen, supra note 130, at 3–4. 
 132. Id. at 31. 
 133. Brown & Gallagher, supra note 127, at 63. 
 134. CHILDREN’S BUREAU MANDATORY REPORTERS, supra note 125, at 2. 
 135. See 2003 MASSACHUSETTS AG EXEC. REPORT, supra note 70, at 3 (finding that clergy 
were not listed as reporters until 2002, too late to cover the conduct). But see 2004 MAINE AG 
REPORT, supra note 53, at 9, 11 (declining to prosecute the Archdiocese for failing to report in 
part because the Archdiocese consistently reported suspected instances of child abuse after clergy 
were added to the list of mandatory reporters in 1997). 
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priests in the 1970s and 80s.”136 The guilty plea came just before 
prosecutors went to the grand jury to indict the archdiocese.137 The 
archdiocese paid the maximum fine of $10,000 and agreed to set up a 
“$3 million fund to compensate sexual abuse victims who cannot sue 
the church because their cases are beyond the statute of limitations.”138  
In another instance, Bishop Robert Finn of the Diocese of Kansas 
City-St. Joseph, Missouri, was convicted of failing to report suspected 
child abuse in September 2012.139 Finn failed to report Father Shawn 
Ratigan for taking “pornographic pictures of young girls” for five 
months from 2010 through early 2011.140 Finn also knew of Ratigan’s 
previous “inappropriate behavior with children” and his possession of 
child pornography but continued to employ him and give him access to 
children to abuse.141 Finn was convicted for failing in his duty as a 
mandatory reporter, a misdemeanor, and the judge dropped two 
charges against the diocese.142 Finn was sentenced to two years of 
court-supervised probation, and was required to set up a $10,000 fund 
for victim counseling and “start a [mandatory-reporter] training 
program for diocesan employees in detecting early signs of child abuse, 
and in what constitutes child pornography and obscenity.”143  
Though he failed to obtain a conviction under a mandatory-
reporter statute, Sonoma County District Attorney Stephan 
Passalacqua used the threat of prosecution under such a statute to 
obtain an admission of guilt and mandatory counseling for a 
supervisory priest.144 On April 27, 2006, Reverend Francisco Ochoa-
Perez, as assistant pastor, confessed to Bishop Daniel Walsh of the 
Santa Rosa Catholic Diocese that he had sexually abused children 
 
 136. Goodstein, supra note 39.  
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Bill Draper, Events of the Child-Porn Case that Brought Down a U.S. Bishop, CRUX 
(Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.cruxnow.com/church/2015/04/22/events-of-the-child-porn-case-that-
brought-down-a-us-bishop [http://perma.cc/YN5W-3FNZ].  
 140. John Eligon & Laurie Goodstein, Kansas City Bishop Convicted of Shielding Pedophile 
Priest, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/kansas-city-bishop-
convicted-of-shielding-pedophile-priest.html [http://perma.cc/7SAG-Z2ZC]. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Doyle, supra note 59; Guy Konver, Reaction: Catholics Praise Deal; Victim Advocates 
Angry, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Nov. 21, 2006), http://www.pressdemocrat.com/news/2116569-181/
reaction-catholics-praise-deal-victim [https://perma.cc/K7UN-XHQF]. 
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three different times.145 Instead of immediately telling the authorities, 
as was required by California’s mandatory-reporting law,146 Walsh first 
consulted with the diocese’s attorney.147 Walsh waited three days 
before telling Sonoma County’s Child Protective Services about 
Ochoa-Perez’s admissions of child sex abuse.148 During the three-day 
delay, Ochoa-Perez escaped to Mexico.149 Walsh’s failure to 
immediately report Ochoa-Perez was likely a violation of California’s 
mandatory-reporting law; however, because Walsh had no prior 
criminal record and admitted wrongdoing, the district attorney offered 
Walsh a four-month counseling program instead of filing misdemeanor 
charges, which Walsh accepted.150 
The Kansas City and Cincinnati convictions were watershed 
moments in holding the Church and supervisory priests accountable 
because the mandatory-reporter statutes were enforced consistently 
with their purpose: punishing those who breached their duty to protect 
children suspected of being abused from further harm.151 Mandatory-
reporter statutes can successfully target clergy as required reporters of 
child abuse, but the statutes fail to adequately encapsulate the 
egregiousness of the supervisory priests’ conduct. Supervisory priests 
did much more than merely fail to report suspected child abuse. 
Supervisory priests knowingly concealed child sex abuse by priests over 
whom they had authority, and sometimes transferred the offending 
priests to new congregations without making the new congregations 
aware of the child-abuse allegations against the priests.152 By not acting 
to protect children, supervisory priests enabled the offending priests to 
continue sexually abusing children. 
The situation at issue here also differs from the prototypical 
situation in which mandatory-reporting statutes were meant to apply. 
The original purpose of mandatory-reporting statutes was to require 
physicians and other professionals who may observe physical injuries 
 
 145. Doyle, supra note 59.  
 146. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 2006) (requiring the mandated reporter to “make an 
initial report . . . immediately . . . and send . . . a written followup report within 36 hours of 
receiving the information concerning the incident”).   
 147. Doyle, supra note 59. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. For further discussion on the original purpose of mandatory-reporter laws, see supra 
notes 130–32 and accompanying text.  
 152. For further discussion of supervisory priests’ role in perpetuating child sex abuse by 
lower-ranking priests, see supra notes 43, 52–53 and accompanying text. 
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in the course of their work with children to report suspected child 
abuse to the relevant authorities.153 Supervisory priests are unlike 
typical mandatory reporters because they have authority over the 
perpetrators of the abuse and, by failing to use that authority to protect 
children from the abusers, facilitate further child sex abuse. With 
supervisory priests, there is often a repeated failure to act on reliable 
reports of offending priests’ sexual abuse. The failure to report the 
offending priest is the most basic crime of which supervisory priests are 
guilty. But supervisory priests’ conduct is more egregious, enabling 
individuals under their authority to sexually abuse children by failing 
to remove the abusive priest even after receiving credible allegations 
of abuse. Therefore, although mandatory-reporter statutes are legally 
sufficient to cover the conduct of supervisory priests, those statutes, 
like delinquency and obstruction-of-justice statutes, do not adequately 
capture the culpability of supervisory priests. 
II.  CHILD ENDANGERMENT: MORALLY SUFFICIENT YET LEGALLY 
INADEQUATE 
The final way prosecutors have attempted to hold supervisory 
priests accountable is through child-endangerment statutes. Child 
endangerment is an apt description of supervisory priests’ conduct, but 
child-endangerment statutes are not legally sufficient to cover the 
conduct of supervisory priests because supervisory priests 1) are not a 
class of individuals targeted by the statute, and therefore do not have 
a duty to the abused children, and 2) do not engage in the direct 
supervision of children. Although “an argument could be made that 
the individual priests had a duty of care for the children they assaulted, 
it is impossible to transfer this duty to [supervisory priests].”154 In 
addition, “it is even more difficult to show that [supervisory priests] 
were responsible for ‘supervising the welfare’ of all the children 
 
 153. For further discussion of supervisory priests’ role in perpetuating child sex abuse by 
lower-ranking priests, see supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.  
 154. Jesse Belcher-Timme, Unholy Acts: The Clergy Sex Scandal in Massachusetts and the 
Legislative Response, 30 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 243, 264 (2004) (referring 
specifically to child-endangerment statutes based on the MPC). But cf. Martinelli v. Bridgeport 
Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 430 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that it was reasonable 
for a jury to conclude that a diocese owed a fiduciary duty to a minor parishioner who was sexually 
abused by a priest when the diocese received detailed allegations of abuse and failed to investigate 
them or warn other parishioners).  
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alleging abuse.”155 Nevertheless, despite these legal inadequacies, 
several jurisdictions have attempted to prosecute supervisory priests or 
churches under child-endangerment statutes.  
A. Legal Elements of the MPC’s Child-Endangerment Statute 
The modern child-endangerment statute used in many states is 
based on MPC § 230.4,156 which criminalizes endangering the welfare 
of a child.157 That statute reads, “A parent, guardian, or other person 
supervising the welfare of a child under 18 commits a misdemeanor if 
he knowingly endangers the child’s welfare by violating a duty of care, 
protection, or support.”158 The scope of individuals covered under the 
statute is limited to parents, guardians, or others in similar roles.159  
Because the statute imposes a duty on a certain class of 
individuals, a breach of that duty can occur by the duty-bearers’ acts or 
omissions. The statute was meant to apply only “to those legal duties 
arising by reason of the actor’s status as a ‘parent, guardian, or other 
person supervising the welfare of the child.’”160 The legal duty “may 
arise from contractual obligation, from settled principles of tort or 
family law, or from other legal sources.”161 The MPC commentary 
explicitly distinguishes the legal duty from a duty “owed by all citizens 
to one another or . . . which a stranger may owe to a minor.”162 The 
commentary also states that “the actor must know of the facts giving 
rise to the duty of care, protection, or support, though . . . [not that] the 
law . . . imposes the legal duty.”163  
 
 155. Belcher-Timme, supra note 154, at 264–65; see also 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 65 (justifying a grand jury’s decision not to charge supervisory priests with child 
endangerment because “[h]igh-level Archdiocese officials . . . were far removed from any direct 
contact with children” (emphasis added)). 
 156. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 cmt. 4 at 452 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980). 
 157. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4; see also 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304 (West 
2006) (using similar wording as § 230.4); 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT supra note 43, at 3 
(noting that New Hampshire’s statute was adapted from § 230.4). 
 158. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4.  
 159. Id. 
 160. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 cmt. 2 at 450 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980).  
 161. Id. § 230.4 cmt. 3 at 450–51. 
 162. Id. § 230.4 cmt. 3 at 451.  
 163. Id. § 230.4 cmt. 3 at 452.  
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B. Child-Endangerment Statutes Reflect the Moral Culpability of 
Supervisory Priests’ Conduct 
As the Philadelphia grand jury pointed out in its 2005 report, “In 
the common sense of the term, the actions of the church hierarchy 
clearly constituted endangerment of the welfare of children.”164 In the 
case of supervisory priests, endangering the welfare of children is the 
most appropriate description of their wrongful conduct. After 
becoming aware of abuse by certain priests, supervisory priests 
routinely ignored or concealed the offending priests’ conduct at the 
expense of children’s physical and emotional welfare.165 These 
supervisory priests actively chose to endanger the welfare of minors—
one of the most vulnerable populations that the law seeks to 
protect166—by knowingly allowing them to be in the care of priests who 
had a record of child sex abuse.167 Supervisory priests also endangered 
the welfare of children by transferring priests to other parishes without 
notifying the parish of why the priest was being transferred or his 
history of sexual abuse, endangering more unwitting children.168 The 
harm that statutes seek to prevent is often not a perfect match with the 
conduct in particular cases; however, the harm sought to be prevented 
by child-endangerment statutes comes closest to the harm inflicted on 
sexually abused children by supervisory priests. This match between 
supervisory priests’ conduct and child endangerment led prosecutors 
in two states to use child-endangerment statutes based on the MPC to 
hold supervisory priests accountable.  
C. Child-Endangerment Plea: 2002 Diocese of Manchester, New 
Hampshire  
1. Relevant Conduct and the New Hampshire Child-Endangerment 
Statute.  A report released by the New Hampshire attorney general 
 
 164. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 65. 
 165. For further discussion and examples of supervisory priests’ role in perpetuating child sex 
abuse by lower-ranking priests, see supra notes 43, 50–53, 75, 78, 100 and accompanying text.  
 166. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (describing children as having peculiar 
vulnerabilities and noting that states can adjust legal systems to protect them); see also 2016 
PENNSYLVANIA GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 147 (“There is no member of the public in greater 
need of protection than our children.”).  
 167. For further discussion and examples of supervisory priests’ role in perpetuating child sex 
abuse by lower-ranking priests, see supra notes 43, 50–53, 75, 78, 100 and accompanying text. 
 168. For further discussion of how supervisory priests transferred known abusive priests to 
other parishes without disclosing prior abuse allegations against those priests, see supra notes 9, 
52–53, 100 and accompanying text. 
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detailed the conduct of eight priests at the Diocese of Manchester who 
sexually abused children and the diocese’s failure to remove those 
priests after repeated reports of abuse.169 Beyond just knowing about 
the child sex abuse and failing to terminate or report the offending 
priests, the diocese transferred the priests to other congregations 
without any limitations, leading to sexual assaults of more children.170  
New Hampshire’s child-endangerment statute is modeled on the 
MPC child-endangerment statute.171 In relevant part, it reads, “A 
person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child . . . if he knowingly 
endangers the welfare of a child under 18 years of age . . . by purposely 
violating a duty of care, protection or support he owes to such child.”172 
Based on the breadth of individuals covered by New Hampshire’s 
child-endangerment statute,173 which just mentions “a person” and not 
parents or guardians, the attorney general determined that “the 
Diocese owe[d] a duty of care to its minor parishioners.”174 
Accordingly, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester signed a 
nonprosecution agreement with the New Hampshire attorney general 
in December 2002.175 As part of the nonprosecution agreement, the 
diocese acknowledged that the state likely could have convicted the 
diocese of child endangerment had the case gone to trial.176 
Additionally, the attorney general found that “the Diocese knew that 
a particular priest was sexually assaulting minors, . . . took inadequate 
or no action to protect these children within the parish, and . . . the 
priest subsequently committed additional acts of sexual abuse against 
children that the priest had contact with through the church.”177 Lastly, 
the agreement called for the Diocese to ensure “that no person who is 
known to have abused a child will either continue or ever be placed in 
 
 169. 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT, supra note 43. 
 170. See id. at 71, 112. 
 171. Id. at 3. Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3, I (LexisNexis 2015) (“A person is guilty 
of endangering the welfare of a child . . . if he knowingly endangers the welfare of a child under 
18 years of age . . . by purposely violating a duty of care, protection or support he owes to such 
child . . . .”), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980) (“A parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 
18 commits a misdemeanor if he knowingly endangers the child’s welfare by violating a duty of 
care, protection or support.”). 
 172. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3, I. 
 173. 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT supra note 43, at 4. 
 174.  Id. at 5. 
 175. 2002 New Hampshire Agreement, supra note 36. 
 176. Id. at 2.  
 177. 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT, supra note 43, at 1.  
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ministry”178 and to train staff and abide by mandatory-reporting 
requirements.179  
2. Legal Inadequacy of New Hampshire’s Child-Endangerment 
Statute for Prosecution of Supervisory Priests.  By obtaining an 
admission that the New Hampshire attorney general had sufficient 
evidence to convict the Diocese of Manchester of child endangerment, 
the attorney general avoided adjudicating the matter. If he had gone to 
court, he likely would have lost. One difference between the MPC and 
New Hampshire child-endangerment statutes is that the New 
Hampshire statute does not limit the individuals covered to a “parent, 
guardian, or other person having supervisory control over the child,”180 
but broadens the statute to cover any “person.”181 The New Hampshire 
attorney general issued an investigatory report that detailed the legal 
theories underpinning the nonprosecution agreement and based the 
likelihood of a successful prosecution on the more expansive language 
used in the New Hampshire statute.182 After stating that “whether the 
Diocese owed a duty of care to its child parishioners” is the “essential 
threshold issue” for the diocese’s culpability, the report argues in favor 
of diocesan culpability because, unlike the MPC statute, “New 
Hampshire’s statute is not limited to a parent, guardian, or other 
person having supervisory control over the child, but includes anyone 
who owes the child a duty of care.”183 By this logic, the New Hampshire 
statute, unlike the MPC statute, covers individuals like supervisory 
priests who do not have a relationship akin to that of a parent or 
guardian to the child-victim.  
However, a later decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
concluded that the legislature had no intent to broaden the MPC 
version of the child-endangerment statute to include individuals like 
supervisory priests. In State v. Yates,184 the court addressed the scope 
 
 178. 2002 New Hampshire Agreement, supra note 36, at 3. 
 179. Id. at 4–6. 
 180. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980). 
 181. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3, I (LexisNexis 2015); 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT 
supra note 43, at 4. For a comparison of the MPC and New Hampshire statutory language, see 
supra note 171. 
 182. See 2003 NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT supra note 43, at 4–6 (using a case that dealt 
with the broadening language as the basis for the State’s expectation of proving the diocese owed 
a duty).  
 183. Id. at 4. 
 184. State v. Yates, 876 A.2d 176 (N.H. 2005).  
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of the term “duty of care” as used in the New Hampshire statute—an 
issue of first impression.185 Yates was a child-endangerment 
prosecution of an eighteen-year-old man who gave alcohol to a 
fourteen-year-old girl until she became intoxicated, removed her 
clothes, sexually assaulted her,186 and then “abandon[ed] her outside in 
below freezing temperatures.”187 Because “duty of care” is not defined 
in the statute, the court examined the legislative history, which 
indicated that the New Hampshire statute is based on the MPC 
version.188 The court found that the change in statutory language did 
not reflect an intentional broadening of the statute’s scope.189 First, the 
court reasoned that the MPC commentary demonstrates the duty 
mentioned in the statute “was intended to refer only to those who have 
a parental or supervisory relationship with a child,” and because the 
legislature is “not presumed to . . . enact redundant provisions,” the 
legislature enacted the statute to include “[a] person” instead of 
“parents, guardians, or other persons” merely to avoid redundancy 
with the duty part of the statute.190 Next, because the legislature kept 
the MPC’s language related to a duty “of ‘care, protection, or 
support,’” the court reasoned, consistent with the MPC statute, that the 
legislature intended to “limit criminal liability . . . to those who have a 
familial, or similar/supervisory relationship with [the] minor.”191 
Finally, the court looked to the title of the criminal code chapter in 
which the statute is located, titled “Offenses Against the Family,” to 
further support its reasoning that the statute was only meant to cover 
those “persons having a familial, or similar/supervisory relationship 
with the victim.”192  
Given the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s subsequent rejection 
of the theory on which the Manchester Diocese’s nonprosecution 
agreement rested, it is likely that the diocese and its supervisory priests 
were not within the scope of the child-endangerment statute. The 
defendant in Yates directly supervised and assaulted a child, and the 
 
 185. Id. at 184 (“[The defendant] challenges only the application of the term ‘duty of care’ [in 
the statute] to the circumstances of this case. The defendant’s challenge presents an issue of first 
impression.”). 
 186. Id. at 178–79.  
 187. Id. at 187.  
 188. Id. at 185.  
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. at 185–86. 
 191. Id. at 186. 
 192. Id.  
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court still found that he had no duty to the child. Thus, it is unlikely 
that the court would have held that a supervisory priest, who had no 
direct contact with minor parishioners, had a duty to them under New 
Hampshire’s child-endangerment statute.  
D. Child-Endangerment Conviction: 2011 Archdiocese of 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
1. Relevant Conduct and the Pennsylvania Child-Endangerment 
Statute.  The other child-endangerment conviction for a supervisory 
priest was the Philadelphia district attorney’s conviction of Msgr. 
Lynn.193 Msgr. Lynn, as Secretary of the Clergy, was responsible for 
“investigat[ing] any allegations of sexual abuse by priests . . . [and] 
mak[ing] sure that no priest with a history of sexual abuse of minors 
was recommended for assignments.”194 By failing to act on knowledge 
that Reverend Edward V. Avery and other priests were sexually 
abusing children, Msgr. Lynn “allow[ed] [Avery and others] to remain 
in positions where they could continue to prey on children . . . [and] 
recommended . . . that the abusers be transferred to new parishes.”195 
Msgr. Lynn was charged and convicted under Pennsylvania’s child-
endangerment statute, which is based on the MPC’s statute.196 
Pennsylvania’s child-endangerment statute states, “A parent, 
guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 
years of age . . . commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the 
welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or 
support.”197 Unlike the nonprosecution agreement with the Diocese of 
Manchester, the prosecution of Msgr. Lynn was tried in state court.198  
2. Legal Insufficiency of Pennsylvania’s Child-Endangerment 
Statute.  After a grand jury reversed a prior grand jury’s decision, a jury 
convicted Msgr. Lynn, and the Superior Court threw out the conviction 
 
 193. For a more detailed description of the case against Msgr. Lynn, see supra notes 11–33 
and accompanying text.  
 194. 2011 Philadelphia GJ Report, supra note 7, at 43. 
 195. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 43–53 (specifying the priests, including Avery, who 
Lynn knew had sexually abused children). 
 196. For further discussion, see supra notes 13, 25, 31 and accompanying text.  
 197. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304(a)(1) (West 2015).  
 198. For a more detailed description of Msgr. Lynn’s trials in Pennsylvania state court, see 
supra notes 25–33 and accompanying text.  
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on appeal,199 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinstated Msgr. Lynn’s 
conviction of child endangerment in April 2015.200 The court based its 
opinion on the notion that the child-endangerment statute was meant 
“to cover a broad range of conduct in order to safeguard the welfare 
and security of . . . children.”201 Given that purpose and the statute’s 
“plain and unambiguous” language,202 the court concluded that 
“criminal liability does not turn on whether the offender was 
supervising . . . the . . . children” because it would “render meaningless 
the precise statutory language encompassing the child’s welfare.”203 
The court continued, “[T]he requirement of supervision is not limited 
to only . . . direct or actual [supervision] . . . [but] [b]y its plain terms it 
encompasses all forms of supervision of a child’s welfare.”204 But 
holding Msgr. Lynn liable for child endangerment was an 
impermissible expansion of the scope of the statute that is inconsistent 
with the MPC commentary, the statute’s legislative history, and 
Pennsylvania court precedent.  
The first grand jury that sought an indictment against Msgr. Lynn 
concluded, consistently with the MPC commentary and Pennsylvania’s 
historic interpretation,205 that “the offense of endangering welfare of 
children is too narrow to support a successful prosecution of the 
decisionmakers who were running the Archdiocese . . . [because they] 
were far removed from any direct contact with children.”206 The grand 
jury recommended that the legislature broaden the child-
endangerment statute to include individuals in positions like those of 
supervisory priests.207 The Pennsylvania legislature subsequently 
amended the child-endangerment statute with the support of the 
 
 199. For a more detailed description of these events, see supra notes 14–30 and accompanying 
text.  
 200. For further discussion on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinstating Msgr. Lynn’s 
conviction, see supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 201. Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 818 (Pa. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Mack, 
359 A.2d 770, 772 (Pa. 1976)).  
 202. Id. at 823.  
 203. Id. at 824.  
 204. Id.  
 205. For further discussion on the first Philadelphia grand jury’s findings regarding Msgr. 
Lynn, see supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.  
 206. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 65.  
 207. For a more detailed description of the first Philadelphia grand jury’s recommendations 
to the Pennsylvania legislature, see supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
WASSERMAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/30/2017  11:38 AM 
2017]     SUPERVISORY PRIEST ACCOUNTABILITY 1181 
Philadelphia district attorney.208 In Commonwealth v. Lynn,209 
Pennsylvania argued that the legislature’s amendment to the statute 
was merely a clarification of the statute’s applicability to supervisory 
priests;210 however, “[a] change in the language of a statute ordinarily 
indicates a change in legislative intent.”211 Here, the consensus among 
the first grand jury, the Pennsylvania legislature, and the previous 
Philadelphia district attorney that the pre-amendment child-
endangerment statute did not apply to supervisory priests provides 
strong support for the inapplicability of the pre-amendment statute to 
people in Msgr. Lynn’s position. 
In addition, holding individuals who never had direct contact with 
children liable for child endangerment was unprecedented in 
Pennsylvania. The Superior Court noted in Lynn that “neither [the 
Superior Court] nor [the] Supreme Court ha[d] ever affirmed a 
conviction for [child endangerment] whe[n] the accused was not 
actually engaged in the supervision of, or was responsible for 
supervising, the endangered child.”212 Individuals have been convicted 
under the child-endangerment statute who were not the parent or 
guardian of the child,213 but there was not one conviction for child 
endangerment when the individual was not engaged in the direct 
supervision of a child. That fact—combined with the plain language of 
the statute, the MPC commentary, and the initial consensus between 
the grand jury, district attorney, and state legislature—makes it likely 
that Pennsylvania convicted Msgr. Lynn of violating a statute that had 
never been interpreted to apply to his conduct. Accordingly, Msgr. 
Lynn likely had no constitutionally required notice that the child-
endangerment statute covered his reprehensible conduct.214 
 
 208. For further discussion of the Pennsylvania legislature’s actions in response to the first 
Philadelphia grand jury’s recommendations, see supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.  
 209. Commonwealth v. Lynn, 83 A.3d 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013). 
 210. Id. at 448 (“The Commonwealth contends . . . the amendment was merely a clarification 
of, rather than a substantial change of, the pre-amended statute’s scope of liability.”).  
 211. Masland v. Bachman, 374 A.2d 517, 521 (Pa. 1977).  
 212. Commonwealth v. Lynn, 83 A.3d 434, 450 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).  
 213. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Trippett, 932 A.2d 188, 195 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (finding 
defendant liable under a child-endangerment statute when he was not a parent or guardian but 
lived in the same home as the child and took care of the child).  
 214. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964) (noting that an unconstitutional 
“deprivation of the right of fair warning can result . . . from an unforeseeable and retroactive 
judicial expansion of . . . statutory language [and interpretation]”).  
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III.  PRESCRIPTIONS FOR PROSECUTION 
Despite the Church’s efforts since 2002 to combat pervasive child 
sex abuse by priests,215 there continue to be hundreds of new reports of 
such abuse each year.216 States can pursue several methods to ensure 
that supervisory priests are held accountable for any role they play in 
covering up and facilitating reports of abuse.  
A. Extend Statutes of Limitations and Include Clergy as Mandatory 
Reporters  
First, clergy should be added to the list of mandatory reporters, 
and the statutes of limitations for mandatory-reporting statutes and 
child-endangerment should be eliminated.217 Because not all states 
include clergy among mandatory reporters,218 states could simply 
amend those statutes to include clergy so they can prosecute clergy for 
failing to report suspicions of child sex abuse committed by other 
priests.  
Additionally, just as the Pennsylvania legislature recognized when 
it extended the statute of limitations for child endangerment in 2006,219 
victims of child sex abuse typically fail to report the abuse until long 
after it occurred.220 Child sex abusers and individuals who have a duty 
to report suspicions of abuse should not escape criminal liability merely 
because the psychological harm resulting from abuse hinders reporting 
for decades after abuse occurs.221 As of May 2016, thirty-eight states 
have removed the criminal statute of limitations for many child sex 
 
 215. See 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 (2016) (citing the annual audits of dioceses 
and eparchies by the Church for child sex abuse allegations since the implementation of the 
Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People in 2002). 
 216. For more detailed statistics, see supra note 4. 
 217. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 64, at 431–36 (discussing the effects of statute-of-
limitations extensions for child sex abuse and suggesting the addition of mandatory-reporting 
requirements for clergy); Russell, supra note 64, at 914–15 (proposing amending mandatory-
reporter statutes to include clergy and extending statutes of limitations for child sex abuse crimes 
as ways to hold supervisory priests accountable).  
 218. For further discussion of states’ approach to mandatory reporting, see supra notes 134–
35 and accompanying text.  
 219. Act of Nov. 29, 2006, No. 179, 2006 Pa. Laws 1581 (codified as amended at 42 PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5552(c)(3) (West 2007)). 
 220. For statistics on the prevalence of delayed reporting of child sex abuse by victims and 
further discussion on the negative effects of child sex abuse, see supra notes 45–47, 62–64 and 
accompanying text.  
 221. Cf. Russell, supra note 64, at 914 (arguing that “delayed reporting . . . of sexual abuse 
should not prevent child molesters from facing prosecution”).  
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crimes, and eight states have removed the civil statute of limitations for 
child sex abuse.222 Other states have had difficulty making these 
changes, as states like New York and Pennsylvania have struggled to 
pass legislation expanding the statutes of limitations for all crimes 
involving child sex abuse due to “opposition from Roman Catholic 
leaders, who say the changes could target them unfairly and could 
bankrupt church organizations.”223  
As an alternative to eliminating or extending statutes of 
limitations for sex crimes against children, some states have passed 
“window” statutes, which create brief periods during which victims can 
bring claims against child sex abusers when their causes of action have 
otherwise expired.224 These statutes have typically succeeded in 
encouraging victims of child sex abuse to come forward. For example, 
approximately 1150 claims were filed during a one-year window in 2003 
in California, and approximately 1175 claims were filed during a two-
year window from 2007–2009 in Delaware.225 The relative success of 
reopening statutes of limitations for designated periods demonstrates 
that giving child sex abuse victims an opportunity to come forward later 
in life, either by extending or eliminating the statute of limitations, will 
ensure greater accountability for culpable supervisory priests and 
direct abusers of minors.  
B. Amend Child-Endangerment Statutes Based on the Model Penal 
Code 
Second, legislatures can choose to amend child-endangerment 
statutes to encompass the conduct of supervisory priests and others 
similarly situated. Pennsylvania expanded the scope of its statute in 
2006 to include “a person that employs or supervises” a parent, 
guardian or other person supervising the welfare of a child.226 The 
 
 222. MARCI A. HAMILTON, CARDOZO LAW JACOB BURNS INST. FOR ADVANCED LEGAL 
STUDIES, SUMMARY OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS REFORM ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 5−7 
(2016), http://sol-reform.com/snapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/QF9R-EXB9]. 
 223. Brian Mann, Catholic Church Groups Fight Bills to Revive Old Sex Abuse Cases, NPR 
(Aug. 24, 2016, 4:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/08/24/484995344/catholic-church-groups-fight-
bills-to-revive-old-sex-abuse-cases [https://perma.cc/KZ57-HHAR].  
 224. Hamilton, supra note 64, at 433.  
 225. MARCI A. HAMILTON, CARDOZO LAW JACOB BURNS INST. FOR ADVANCED LEGAL 
STUDIES, THE RELATIVE SUCCESS OF SOL WINDOW AND REVIVAL STATUTES STATE-BY-
STATE 1−3 (2016), http://sol-reform.com/News/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/RelativeSuccess_5_
16_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/LM3F-T6K2]. 
 226. Act of Nov. 29, 2006, No. 179, 2006 Pa. Laws 1581 (codified as amended at 18 PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304(a) (West 2007)).  
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amendment also clarified that “the term ‘person supervising the 
welfare of a child’ means a person other than a parent or guardian that 
provides care, education, training or control of a child.”227 But it is 
unclear whether that amendment now includes the conduct of 
supervisory priests because the statute still requires that the individual 
violate “a duty of care, protection or support.”228 The determinative 
issue in Lynn was whether supervisory priests could be said to be 
“supervising” children, not whether the defendant had a duty to 
them.229 The 2006 amendment did not say anything about whether 
those newly included individuals had a duty of care, protection, or 
support for the child.230 It would make sense to read the statute as 
implying that the supervisors of those who care for the welfare of a 
child have a duty to the child, but without relevant legislative history 
or court interpretations of the amended statute, it is unclear whether 
supervisors have such a duty. Therefore, in amending child-
endangerment statutes to include supervisory priests within their 
scope, states should explicitly indicate that a duty of care to the minor 
is imposed on individuals who supervise employees who directly care 
for the minor.  
C. Enact Statutes that Prohibit the Reckless Creation of or Failure to 
Alleviate a Substantial Risk of Child Sex Abuse 
Another way to criminalize future conduct of supervisory priests 
is to enact an entirely different statute that criminalizes the reckless 
creation of a substantial risk of child sex abuse, and the reckless failure 
to alleviate that risk when there is a duty to do so.231 This type of statute 
was recommended by the Westchester County grand jury232 and the 
2003 Philadelphia grand jury,233 and was enacted by the Massachusetts 
legislature in 2002.234 In responding to sexual abuse allegations against 
 
 227. Id.  
 228. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304(a) (West 2015). 
 229. For further discussion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s rationale in reinstating Msgr. 
Lynn’s conviction, see supra notes 201–04 and accompanying text. 
 230. 2006 Pa. Laws 1581.  
 231. Cf. Russell, supra note 64, at 911–14 (analyzing reckless-endangerment and failure-to-
act statutes as potential avenues of prosecution for supervisory priests and churches, and 
proposing amendments to make those statutes apply more directly to them).  
 232. See 2002 WESTCHESTER NY GJ REPORT, supra note 43, at 13 (recommending that New 
York enact a statute that would criminalize “the reckless supervision by employers of employees 
known to have harmed children”). 
 233. 2003 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 10, at 17.  
 234. Belcher-Timme, supra note 154, at 252. 
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the Church, the Massachusetts state legislature passed a new statute 
that reads:  
Whoever wantonly or recklessly engages in conduct that creates a 
substantial risk of serious bodily injury or sexual abuse to a child or 
wantonly or recklessly fails to take reasonable steps to alleviate such 
risk where there is a duty to act shall be punished by imprisonment 
. . . for not more than 2 ½ years. 
For the purposes of this section, such wanton or reckless behavior 
occurs when a person is aware of and consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that his acts, or omissions where 
there is a duty to act, would result in serious bodily injury or sexual 
abuse to a child. The risk must be of such nature and degree that 
disregard of the risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard 
of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.235 
This statute criminalizes the reckless creation of a substantial risk 
of child sex abuse, and the reckless failure to alleviate that risk when 
there is a duty to do so. In comparison with child-endangerment 
statutes based on the MPC, this statute 1) broadens the type of 
individuals covered under the statute by omitting references to parents 
or guardians, 2) lowers the mens rea, 3) removes the supervision 
requirement, and 4) removes the “care, protection, or support” 
qualifiers to the statutory duty.236  
First, instead of limiting the scope of the statute to a parent, 
guardian, or other person similarly situated,237 the Massachusetts 
statute covers anybody who engages in the actions listed in the 
statute.238 Similar to what the New Hampshire attorney general 
believed about the scope of his state’s child-endangerment statute 
before the Yates decision,239 the Massachusetts statute explicitly covers 
“whoever,” leaving no mistake about the potential scope of the 
 
 235. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13L (West 2015) (emphasis added).  
 236. Compare id. (covering “[w]hoever wantonly or recklessly engages in conduct that creates 
a substantial risk of serious bodily injury or sexual abuse to a child”), with MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 230.4 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (covering “[a] parent, 
guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 . . . [who] knowingly 
endangers the child’s welfare by violating a duty of care, protection or support”). 
 237. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4.  
 238. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 265, § 13L. 
 239. For further discussion of the New Hampshire attorney general’s basis for the 
nonprosecution agreement with the Diocese of Manchester, see supra notes 180–83 and 
accompanying text.  
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statute.240 The breadth of the “whoever” language in the Massachusetts 
statute includes individuals such as supervisory priests or others in 
similar positions.  
Second, the Massachusetts statute lowers the mens rea 
requirement to recklessness from knowledge, as required by the MPC 
child-endangerment statute and statutes based on it. The supervisory 
priests who have been investigated or prosecuted thus far usually knew 
subordinate priests were committing abuse, and requiring knowledge 
under this statute would still likely capture their conduct.241 
Nevertheless, supervisory priests should be exposed to criminal 
liability when they recklessly disregard a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that child sex abuse will occur because “it isn’t hard for the people 
at the top – the people with real power, who should have real 
responsibility – to close their eyes to danger, enabling them to claim 
that they lacked ‘knowledge.’”242 Hopefully, the lower mens rea 
requirement under the Massachusetts statute will incentivize 
supervisory priests to more actively protect children than if they could 
only be held liable for having knowledge of the risk of abuse.  
Next, the Massachusetts statute removes any consideration of 
whether the person directly or indirectly supervised the abused child 
by excluding any mention of supervision from the statute.243 The statute 
does not limit liability to those who supervise children, or to those who 
supervise those who supervise children, but extends it to individuals 
who either create a substantial risk of child sex abuse or fail to alleviate 
 
 240. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13L. In finding that the scope of the New Hampshire child-
endangerment statute was not greater than that of the MPC statute, the court in Yates supported 
its conclusion by noting that the legislature changed the actors referenced because it sought to 
eliminate redundancy in statutes, and the New Hampshire statute retained the MPC language 
related to a duty of “care, protection, or support.” For further discussion, see supra notes 180–83 
and accompanying text. Unlike the New Hampshire statute, the Massachusetts statute does not 
retain the MPC language related to a duty of “care, protection, or support.” Compare N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 639:3, I (LexisNexis 2015) (including only “person[s] . . . purposely violating a duty 
of care, protection or support to [a] child), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13L (containing no 
language addressing an individual’s duties).   
 241. For further discussion on what supervisory priests knew about child sex abuse committed 
by lower-ranking priests, see supra notes 43, 50–53 and accompanying text.  
 242. 2005 PHILADELPHIA GJ REPORT, supra note 14, at 73 (recommending, based on its 
investigation of the Philadelphia Archdiocese, that supervisory priests be held to a recklessness 
standard under child endangerment).  
 243. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13L (lacking any mention of supervision in the statute). 
Child-endangerment statutes based on the MPC, on the other hand, include the requirement that 
the individual be responsible for “supervising the welfare” of a child. MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 230.4 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). 
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one when there is a duty to do so.244 Thus, individuals like supervisory 
priests, who often did not directly supervise children, would be covered 
by the Massachusetts statute.  
Finally, the Massachusetts statute only criminalizes recklessly 
failing to alleviate a substantial risk of child sex abuse when the person 
had a duty to act.245 The duty question exists both in the Massachusetts 
statute and the MPC child-endangerment statute. Neither state that 
used child-endangerment statutes to prosecute supervisory priests and 
the Church seriously analyzed the duty requirement in the statute: New 
Hampshire assumed that the supervisory priests had a duty to 
children,246 and the Pennsylvania courts never reached a duty 
determination because they decided the issue on the “direct 
supervision” element.247 But the MPC child-endangerment statute and 
statutes based on it likely refer to a different duty than the one in the 
Massachusetts statute. First, as noted above, the MPC child-
endangerment statute applies to a “parent, guardian, or other 
person . . . [who] violat[es] a duty of care, protection or support.”248 
The individuals to whom the duty could apply and the type of duty that 
applies are both narrowed in the MPC child-endangerment statute.249  
In contrast, the Massachusetts statute applies to anyone and refers 
to a nonspecific duty.250 Supervisory priests, by virtue of their ability to 
control the employment, assignment, and discipline of offending 
priests, could be said to have breached a duty to protect minor 
parishioners when they had knowledge of credible child sex abuse 
allegations against an offending priest and failed to alleviate the risk of 
harm that priest posed to children. Alternatively, continuing to employ 
a priest against whom there were credible allegations of child sex abuse 
or transferring the priest to another parish without disclosing those 
reports to the new parish may be considered creating a substantial risk 
of child sex abuse. In light of supervisory priests’ authority over the 
 
 244. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 265, § 13L. 
 245. Id. 
 246. For further discussion of this interpretation, see supra notes 181–85 and accompanying 
text.  
 247. See Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 823 (Pa. 2015) (noting that the court did not 
think it needed to engage in an analysis of whether the supervisory priest owed a duty of care to 
the abused children); see also supra notes 201–04 and accompanying text. 
 248. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4.  
 249. For further analysis of the MPC state, see supra notes 180–83, 239–40 and accompanying 
text. 
 250. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13L.  
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abusive priests and their responsibility to investigate allegations of 
child sex abuse, supervisory priests would likely have a duty to minor 
parishioners under the Massachusetts statute.251  
Enacting statutes similar to the Massachusetts statute is likely the 
best way to hold supervisory priests liable for their egregious conduct 
toward children. In addition to legally encompassing supervisory 
priests and their conduct, the statute punishes supervisory priests with 
up to two-and-a-half years of imprisonment. Because the statute 
specifically targets individuals who create or fail to alleviate a 
substantial risk of child sex abuse—a close fit with supervisory priests’ 
wrongful conduct—the blameworthiness associated with the 
Massachusetts statute is commensurate with the moral culpability of 
supervisory priests.  
D. Continue Prosecutions Under Legally Sufficient Statutes 
Finally, if states do not enact statutes similar to Massachusetts’s 
statute, prosecutors can simply continue prosecuting individuals under 
obstruction-of-justice statutes, delinquency statutes, and mandatory-
reporting statutes that include clergy as mandatory reporters. 
Although those statutes fail to reflect the moral culpability of 
supervisory priests, some accountability is better than none at all—
especially if the threat of prosecution leads to institutional reforms and 
more protections for children.  
CONCLUSION 
Supervisory priests played an active role in concealing reports of 
sexual abuse by offending priests and knowingly created substantial 
risks of sexual abuse to children. The drive to hold supervisory priests 
accountable led prosecutors to turn to statutes that either did not 
match the moral culpability of supervisory priests or did not legally 
encompass their misconduct. Child endangerment matches the moral 
culpability of supervisory priests’ misconduct, but child-endangerment 
statutes modeled on the MPC do not cover supervisory priests or their 
acts. Though supervisory priests chose to ignore and suppress reports 
of child sex abuse by lower-ranking priests, prosecutors may not 
shoehorn misconduct into statutes that do not legally cover it. Instead 
of breaching the supervisory priests’ constitutionally guaranteed notice 
by charging them under MPC-based child-endangerment statutes, 
 
 251. See supra notes 6–10, 43, 50–53 and accompanying text.  
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prosecutors would be better off encouraging state legislatures to pass 
statutes that both legally cover the conduct of supervisory priests and 
adequately reflect their moral culpability. In the absence of 
amendments or newly enacted statutes that meet these criteria, 
prosecutors should settle for statutes that represent a lesser degree of 
moral culpability, such as contributing to the delinquency of a minor or 
mandatory-reporter statutes. The protection of children from future 
institutional concealment and enablement of sexual abuse is 
paramount, and enacting statutes that hold accountable supervisory 
priests and others in like positions will go a long way to deterring 
similar conduct and ensuring that nothing like the Church’s child sex 
abuse crisis happens again.  
